In June 2025, President Trump made a decision he called “historic” — to bomb three of Iran’s nuclear facilities. Vice President JD Vance would go on to justify these strikes by claiming that the United States is “not at war with Iran,” but rather “we’re at war with Iran’s nuclear program.” But what is claimed to be a bid to halt nuclear proliferation may be remembered by history differently.

As of June 24, under pressure from President Trump, a shaky ceasefire has begun to take hold between Israel and Iran, signaling a possible end to the conflict. President Trump has taken advantage of this opportunity by framing the U.S. strikes on Iran as a one-sided victory, with high loss for Tehran and minimal costs for U.S. national interests.

But while President Trump’s military strike in Iran has been framed as deterrent, history and logic suggest the opposite: pressure can provoke. Instead of containing Tehran’s ambitions, such actions may be accelerating Iran’s march toward a nuclear weapon. By undermining diplomatic avenues and reinforcing Iran’s security anxieties, we may be cornering the regime into pursuing nuclear weapons as its only deterrent.

Since the U.S. withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 under the first Trump administration, tensions with Iran have escalated. Since then, Iran has accelerated its enrichment efforts, with the country announcing it would no longer place limits on its uranium enrichment. Additionally, after several inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency has raised numerous concerns over the development of a nuclear weapons program. These developments have driven states like Israel and the U.S. to take preemptive military action, fearing Iran may soon cross the nuclear threshold.

But what history has shown us time and time again is that when a regime feels existentially threatened, it turns to the pursuit of nuclear weapons. In other words, states view the possession of nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent from external threats. For example, Pakistan’s nuclear pursuit was largely driven by fear of coercion from nuclear-armed India, especially in the context of the territorial disputes in the Kashmir region. Another example can be found in North Korea, which began its pursuit of nuclear weapons to use as a deterrent against potential attacks, especially from the United States and its allies in South Korea and Japan.

This logic of security through nuclear deterrence is not theoretical — it’s historical. And Iran may now be following the same perilous script. By striking Iran’s nuclear facilities preemptively, the U.S. has signaled resolve to Iran, demonstrating its willingness to use force to achieve its goals. In other words, strikes aimed at degrading Iran’s military capacity could reinforce the leadership’s belief that only a nuclear deterrent can ensure regime survival.

Additionally, President Trump’s strikes on Iran’s facilities did not end the country’s program — it only delayed it. Missiles can reduce a reactor to rubble — but they can’t bomb away knowledge. Iran has acquired a significant body of indigenous knowledge of nuclear development that realistically cannot be taken away in an attack. In other words, Iran’s scientists will rebuild, just as they did before. By bombing their facilities, yes, Trump has delayed Iran’s nuclear program, but no action taken by Trump could fully erase Iran’s nuclear program.

If the goal is to prevent a nuclear Iran, bombs alone won’t suffice. Lasting nonproliferation demands diplomacy and cooperation, not destruction. By sidelining peaceful tools in favor of force, we risk provoking the very crisis we hope to avoid. It’s time the U.S. chooses strategy over spectacle — and restraint over escalation.